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Abstract
In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran of 1979, a marked schol-
arly interest in Islam driven by policy concerns developed in Western coun-
tries. Hitherto the monopoly of a few Orientalists, Islamic studies soon be-
came a multidisciplinary field, attracting experts across the spectrum of the
social sciences and the humanities, and indeed beyond academia, and many
studies were carried out on Islamism. This article, which focuses on West
Africa, questions some of the widely held assumptions on Islamism. The
author’s main argument is that Islamism is not a new phenomenon. A sec-
ond point made here is that ‘Islamist’ movements are not primarily Salafi. A
third point is that ‘Islamists’ are not inherently violent. What is new, ac-
cording to the author, is the perception of Islamism as a threat in the West.
Résumé
Au lendemain de la révolution islamique iranienne de 1979, une abondante
litérature a été produite en Occident sur l’islamisme en réponse à la demande
des décideurs politiques. Jusque là l’apanage de quelques orientalistes, l’étude
de l’islam est devenue un champ de recherches multidisciplinaire impliquant
des chercheurs dans toutes les branches des sciences humaines et sociales.
Cet article, qui est axé sur l’Afrique de Ouest, questionne de nombreuses
idées recues concernant l’islamisme. L’idée maîtresse de l’article est que
l’islamisme n’est pas un nouveau phénomène. L’auteur fait également valoir
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que les islamistes ne sont pas majoritairement salafi. Enfin, il défend l’idée
que les islamistes ne sont pas violent par essence. Ce qui est nouveau, d’après
l’auteur, c’est la perception que l'Occident a de l’islam comme danger en Occident.
Introduction
As a graduate student in Islamic Studies in Europe, I learnt from the
works of the European experts on modern Islam that ‘Islamism’ is a
twentieth-century phenomenon starting with the rise of Egyptian soci-
ety of the Muslim Brothers of Egypt and reaching its peak in the 1970s
after the decline of Arab nationalism in the aftermath of the defeat of
Arab armies in their war with Israel. This grand narrative has contrib-
uted largely to setting the terms of the debate on ‘Islamism’ in France in
particular. Olivier Roy, for instance, argues that: ‘Beginning in the 1930s,
Hasan al-Banna, the founder in Egypt of the Muslim Brotherhood, and
Abul-Ala Mawdudi the creator of the Indo-Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami party,
introduced a new movement of thought1 that endeavored to define Islam
primarily as a political system, in keeping with the major ideologies of
the twentieth century’ (Roy 1994:viii). In the same vein, Gilles Kepel
argues that ‘In the Muslim countries of the Mediterranean Basin and its
environs, re-Islamization movements2 took over from groups inspired
by Marxism in challenging the foundational values of the social order.
This was during the 1990s’ (Kepel 1994:13) Another French Islamicist,
François Burgat3 wrote that: ‘The Muslim Brothers organized as a party
stating explicitly this-worldly ambition are the first to want to capture
political power and to provide to the projects of the reformist trend the
logistics of a state apparatus. In this sense, they may appear as the first
Islamists’ 4(Burgat 1988:46 my translation). This narrative is not lim-
ited to French Islamic studies. In his Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, which
among other things, analyzes different historical Islamic militant move-
ments qualified as ‘jihad movements’, Columbia University’s Mahmood
Mamdani states that ‘political Islam was born during the colonial pe-
riod’ (Mamdani 2004:14).
While my own earlier work has been informed by this grand narrative
(Kane 1998, 2003), the more I compare so-called Islamist movements
of the twentieth century to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
‘movements of revival and reform’ (Rahman 1977) the more common
denominators I find. In this article, I will first show the similarities be-
tween the rhetoric and strategies of twentieth-century Islamist move-
ments and that of earlier ones. A second goal of this article is to ques-
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tion the widely held assumption that Islamism is primarily a Salafi
phenomenon driven by Wahhabi ideology and Saudi oil wealth. The
third and final goal of this article is to challenge the portrayal of Islamist
movements by the Western media in particular as inherently violent and
non-pragmatic. In conclusion, I will argue that what is really new is not
so much the goals and strategies of Islamic militant movements, as much
the Western perception of Islam as a threat.
 ‘Islamist’ Movements are Not New
In the last few decades, a multitude of terms have been used to describe
the phenomenon of political Islam, by which I mean: the ideology of
religio-political movements striving to establish an Islamic political or-
der either by capturing political power or by initiating a societal transfor-
mation, which would ultimately lead to the rise of an Islamic socio-po-
litical order. These terms include ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, ‘Islamic
activism’, ‘Islamic integrism‘, ‘Islamic radicalism’, ‘Islamic renewal’, ‘Is-
lamic resurgence’, ‘Islamic revivalism’, and ‘new Islamic radicalism’. To
avoid terms with a Christian connotation, some authors have reinvented
the term ‘Islamism’. In fact, the term is not new, at least in the French
language. In writings of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the
French word ‘islamisme’ was used as a synonym of Islam (Houdas 1908;
Bonet-Maury 1906). ‘Islamism’ gained wide currency not only in West-
ern languages, but also ironically in Arabic, where the term has been
translated as ‘Islamiyya’ for Islamism and ‘Islamiyyun’ or ‘Islamawiyyun’
for ‘Islamists’. In the twentieth century, ‘Islamists’ are identified in the
literature as Muslim militant groups that challenged the secularization
of Muslim societies and polities and advocated Islamization of the law,
the economy and the state as the solution.
It has been suggested that Islamist groups could be divided into two
categories. First, there are groups with a stated political agenda aimed at
capturing political power, labeled ‘state-centered Islamists’ (Mamdani
2004) or ‘movements of re-Islamization from above’ (Kepel 1991). Sec-
ond, there are militants who emphasized the necessity to correct reli-
gious and social practices, known as ‘society-centered Islamists’ (Mamdani
2004) or ‘movements of re-Islamization from below’ (Kepel 1991). As we
will discuss below, some movements blur this distinction. In what follows,
we will consider the rise to prominence of militant Muslim movements in
the postcolonial Muslim world and then compare them with earlier mili-
tant Islamic movements in Africa in particular to show the similarities.
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After the consolidation of their rule, European colonial masters for-
bade the implementation of what some deemed inhumane bodily pun-
ishments contained in Islamic criminal law, such as the amputation of
hands as punishment reserved for thieves and death by stoning for adul-
terers. But legal reform did not extend to all spheres of social life. Re-
gardless of the colonial power and its preferred type of rule (indirect or
direct), the colonial state in Africa and Asia allowed Muslims to settle
matters relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance, custody, as well as some
commercial transactions, according to the dispositions of Islamic law, as
codified by one of the main so-called Islamic schools of law.
After independence, the modernizing elites of virtually all predomi-
nantly Muslim countries undertook radical reform of family law, notably
to empower women. They targeted inter alia the aspects of Islamic fam-
ily law relating to polygamy, unilateral repudiation and unequal gender
distribution of inheritance. Tunisia went further than other countries in
its efforts at legal reform. A host of new laws were adopted to promote
women’s rights, including the criminalization of polygamy and unilat-
eral repudiation. Senegal restricted polygamy and imposed the first wife’s
acceptance as a precondition to polygamy. However, the scope of imple-
mentation of the new family laws was limited. In Senegal, according to a
survey conducted by Amsatou Sow Sidibe, more than 90 per cent of
Muslims have ignored the new codes and continue to settle family law
matters according to Islamic laws (Sidibe, cited in Villalon 1995:229).
However, in many spheres, postcolonial state-building required the adop-
tion of Western civil and commercial codes, which did not face serious
challenges in the early postcolonial period, as they were central to the
project of modernization and development. This is particularly true for the
realm of commercial transactions, largely inspired by Western practices.
To achieve the goal of ‘re-Islamizing’ postcolonial Muslim societies,
militant Muslims have adopted diverse strategies from peaceful
proselytization to armed opposition. Some groups focused on re-
Islamizing society, on the assumption that the Islamization of the state
would follow after the society became ‘Islamic’. This has been the case
for most militant Islamic groups in Morocco, for example. Other groups,
such as the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, combined charity work to gain
and retain members with military operations in the 1960s (Mitchell 1969).
As their spectacular and unexpected success in the Egyptian parliamen-
tary elections of December 2005 has shown, they seem to be willing to
play the democratic rules of the game. The result is that they are emerg-
6. Ousmane Kane.pmd 18/08/2009, 17:44160
161Kane: Islamism: What is New, What is Not?
ing as the strongest opposition group in the Egyptian parliament. Other
groups, such as the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria in the 1990s, started
peacefully and then resorted to violence when they faced repression
(Martinez 2000). Among the most successful groups in capturing su-
preme political power or exercising great influence in government, one
can cite the Ayatollahs under the leadership of Khomeini in Iran, the
Jammat Islami in Pakistan, the Muslim Brothers in the Sudan under the
leadership of Hasan Al-Turabi before he fell into disgrace, the Taliban in
Afghanistan until they were for a period driven underground by the US
invasion following the September 11 attacks in the US, Hizbullah in
Lebanon, and finally Hamas in Palestine, the first Muslim political move-
ment to be elected democratically in the Arab world.
Before the 1960s, with a few exceptions, the potential constituencies
of militant ‘Islamist’ movements were quite limited. Since the mid-1960s,
many Muslim nations have experienced both a series of setbacks in the
development process and successive military defeats in the war of Arab
countries against Israel, prompting some to engage in a kind of soul-
searching, leading them to identify the causes of these failures in the
internal weaknesses of Muslim societies. Leftists who still had faith in
Marxism attributed the failures to conservative forces that delayed the
formation of a militant working class that would have promoted revolu-
tion. Liberals attributed the failure to the absence of the rule of law and
a weak civil society that could not hold the state in check. Although the
end of the Cold War and the triumph of neo-liberalism created hope in
the 1990s that most nations were in transition to democracy, a growing
consensus has emerged in the last few years that the consolidation of
democracy is far from granted and that most so-called regimes in transi-
tion still maintain many attributes of authoritarianism (Carothers 2002;
Levitsky and Way 2002). A third group, which had a strong appeal to
sections of the Muslim youth and the middle class, came to diagnose the
developmental failure and ‘decline’ of Muslim societies in their adop-
tion of Western civil and commercial codes and institutions and sug-
gested that the dismantling of such codes and their replacement by Is-
lamic ones would be the panacea. For most of them, the Islamic Revolu-
tion of Iran became the tangible corroboration that greater self-reliance
and Islam could indeed provide an alternative (Esposito 1984:169;
Esposito and Piscatori 1990:319).
When a new vocabulary gains currency, the question that requires an
answer is whether it successfully captures a new class of people or activi-
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ties. If not, there is a compelling case for a new term. In the case of
Islamism, I doubt that this is the case. The twentieth century has wit-
nessed the most dramatic changes in all aspects of human life, including
European colonization of much of the developing world, two world wars
and several other wars of decolonization, tremendous technological
progress, the rise and decline of authoritarian regimes, and the spread of
new forms of social organizations and technologies of rule. All this had
had a tremendous impact in the world in general, and in Muslim socie-
ties in particular. Alongside change, however, there have also been re-
markable continuities, including in the rhetoric and strategies of Islamic
social movements. To highlight such continuities, I will turn to the dis-
cussion of Islamic revival in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century West
Africa, a region relatively neglected in the debate about ‘Islamism’, which
has largely focused on the so-called Central Muslim lands to the detri-
ment of the periphery.
Revival and Reform in West Africa
From North Africa across the Sahara, Islam made inroads into the West-
ern Bilad al-Sudan from the ninth century.5 From the ninth to the six-
teenth centuries, the spread of Islam was very slow and much of the
conversion was limited to the royal courts and circles of merchants in-
volved in the trans-Saharan trade (Hiskett 1984:19; Triaud and Robinson
1997:10; Levtzion and Pouwels 2000:2). Rulers who converted to Islam
did not attempt to Islamize their subjects, not least because their legiti-
macy rested largely on local values and beliefs. Muslim clerics who staffed
the administration of many of these African precolonial kingdoms did
little to challenge non-Islamic practices of nominally Muslim rulers whom
they served. The attitude of learned Muslims towards their non-Muslim
neighbors was that of peaceful coexistence. This was partially explained
by the fact that Muslims were a minority and therefore could hardly
impose their religion (Triaud and Robinson 1997:10). However, it also
rested on an ideological justification elaborated by al-Hajj Salim Suwari,
who lived in the late fifteenth century and originated from Masina (in
present-day Mali). Many hagiographies on Suwari circulated widely in
Senegambia, and in particular among the clerical group known as the
Jakhanke. Suwari’s teachings were based on the principles that unbelief
was the consequence of ignorance and that God’s grand design for the
world is such that some people would remain longer in the ‘state of
ignorance’ than others. Conversion would occur in due course, accord-
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ing to God’s plans (Wilks 2000:98). Consequently, both proselytizing
and military jihads were unacceptable interference with God’s will. Suwari
also taught that non-Muslim rule was not only acceptable to Muslims,
but should be supported by the latter insofar as it enabled them to fol-
low the Sunna of the Prophet (Wilks 2000:98). Above all, Suwari be-
lieved that Muslims should pursue the search for education and provide
‘unbelievers’ with a model that they could emulate in due course when
the time of conversion came, according to God’s plans (Wilks 2000:98).
Such a worldview enabled the Juula to engage in peaceful trade with the
Gentiles for several generations (Hiskett 1984:170).
The seventeenth century witnessed a pattern of change as some Muslim
clerics began to challenge ‘non-Islamic rule’. Coming from the south-
west of present-day Mauritania, the first cleric to advocate and fight for
reform was the Berber scholar Awbek b. Aschfaghu, known as Imam
Nasir al-Din (Robinson 2000:133), who belonged to the maraboutic
tribe of Banu Dayman. He rebelled against the domination of the Bani
Hassan, Arab-speaking warrior peoples, whom he portrayed as bad
Muslims. The key ideas that influenced Nasir al-Din were the anticipa-
tion of the end of time and the arrival of a Muslim eschatological figure
known as the awaited Mahdi and the notion of the Prophet Muhammad
as a perfect man, which provided ideological justification for perfection
to be realized through Islamic reform (Hiskett 1984:140).
Nasir al-Din’s goal was to set up a unified community living accord-
ing to Islamic sharia under the leadership of an imam, namely Nasir al-
Din himself. He recruited Wolof and Fulbe followers in the Senegambian
region, who in 1670 succeeded in overthrowing the ruling dynasties in
the neighboring Senegambian states of Cajoor, Jolof, Walo, and Fuuta
Toro. The reform movement led by Nasir al-Din is known as the
Shurbubba war, a term that refers to the war of clerics to establish a
state governed by Islam.
Early efforts for reform were not successful in establishing lasting
Islamic entities in the Western Sudan as Nasir al-Din was ultimately
killed in a battle and the Bani Hassan reasserted their domination in
southwestern Mauritania. Likewise, his followers’ domination over
Senegambian kingdoms lasted barely ten years as former rulers of these
kingdoms garnered support from the French to reconquer their lands.
However, the jihadist impulse in the spirit of ‘Shurbubba’ remained alive
among some disciples of Nasir al-Din who strove to communicate their
vision of an ideal Islamic society to future generations.
6. Ousmane Kane.pmd 18/08/2009, 17:44163
164 AJIA 11: 2, 2008
Unlike Juula Muslims whose main mode of subsistence was com-
merce and who stayed away from subversive movements that would upset
these profitable business arrangements (Hiskett 1984:170), the revolu-
tionary movements of reform and state-building in eighteenth- and nine-
teenth-century West Africa were largely led and backed by the agricul-
turalist/pastoralist Fulbe (Triaud and Robinson 1997:11; Robinson
2000:131; Last:1987 passim). That they longed for the Islamic ideal de-
scribed in the books of the classical period they had read is obvious.
However, their movements did not emerge in a social or economic vacuum.
The increasing levels of violence, taxation, and enslavement of Muslims
were key factors that shaped the emerging jihadist attitude among Mus-
lim clerics (Robinson 2000). Unlike court ulama, jihadist-minded clerics
operated far from state courts. They were able to organize themselves
and to train enough disciples to pursue jihad. From the beginning of the
eighteenth century until the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the late nineteenth
century, these militant Muslims waged a number of successful move-
ments of reform, captured supreme political power, and created Islamic
states in West Africa. The Fulbe revealed themselves to be much more
aggressive and less tolerant than Mandinka-speaking clerics in the
Suwarian tradition of peaceful coexistence with the Gentiles. Five of the
Fulbe movements deserve particular mention: the jihads of Karamokho
Alpha in Fuuta Jallon, the Torodbe Revolution in Fuuta Toro and Fuuta
Jallon, the Jihad of Al-Hajj Umar and that of Usuman dan Fodio in
present-day Northern Nigeria.6
The leaders and contexts of these West African revolutions of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries share many commonalities with each
other and with those of so-called Islamist movements of more recent
times, including the sense of alienation vis-à-vis their environment, their
attribution of economic and social problems to the failure to establish
God’s rule, and their critical attitude towards the court ulama.
Regarding their sense of alienation vis-à-vis their environment, Nasir
al-Din, Sulayman Bal, Karamokho Alpha, Usman DanFodio, and
Ahmadu Lobbo charged respectively the rulers of the Fuuta Toro, Fuuta
Jallon, Masina, and Gobir with failing to govern according to the meth-
ods that Allah had revealed. This argument is identical to more contem-
porary thinkers of political Islam. One such thinker is Sayyid Qutb (1906–
66), one of the most famous ‘Islamist’ theorists and activists of the twen-
tieth century. Unlike previous Muslim reformers who had attempted to
build a bridge between Islam and the West, such as Al-Afghani,
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Muhammad ’Abduh, or Rashid Rida, Sayyid Qutb saw nothing good in
the West whose influence he thought Muslims should avoid. In his book
Signposts on the Road, Ma’alim fi al-tariq (1964), Qutb, who had studied
at Stanford University and the University of Colorado, submitted that
sovereignty belongs only to God and based his claim among other argu-
ments, on the reinterpretation of three verses of the Koran:5.44, 5.45,
and 5.47. These verses respectively read as follows: ‘he/she who does
not judge by which Allah has revealed, such are the unjust; he/she who
does not judge by which Allah had revealed such are the evil-doers; he/
she who does not judge by which Allah has revealed, such are the unbe-
lievers’.
To the Arabic word ‘hkm’, which occurs in all three verses, earlier
interpretations attributed the meaning of ‘to judge’. In contrast, Qutb
interpreted ‘hkm’ as ‘to rule’ and concluded that only those who rule as
Allah has revealed are legitimate and must be obeyed. Conversely, he
argued, societies not governed by Islamic constitutional, civil, commer-
cial, and penal laws fall in the realm of what he qualified as ‘Jahiliyya’,
ignorance. True Muslims must withdraw from such a society in the same
way as the Prophet Muhammad, who left Mecca in the 622, to seek
refuge in Medina. Furthermore, true Muslims should make it a priority
to bring down those illegitimate rulers and have them replaced by real
Muslims who would establish the rule of God.
The authoritarian socialist/nationalist regime of President Gamal
Abdul Nasser of Egypt under which Qutb lived was the primary target of
this criticism, but Qutb also included all other regimes not governed by
Islamic law. Sayyid Qutb was ultimately hanged by Nasser’s regime, but
his writings were translated into several languages and exercised a pro-
found influence on late twentieth-century militant Islam, not only in the
Arab world, but also in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and among Muslim
communities in the West. In Egypt, the Society of Muslims, known also
as Takfir wal hijra, led by Shukri Mustafa is one such group, which with-
drew from Egyptian society to live in autarky. Qutb was also a source of
influence on the Brothers in Nigeria led by Ibrahim al-Zakzaky, whose
members abstain from working in any government on the grounds that
the secular government is a system based on unbelief (i.e. a kufr-ori-
ented system).
Another common denominator is that West African Muslim reform-
ers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and so-called Islamists of
the twentieth century both operated in the context of social and eco-
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nomic deprivation, which, they held, was the responsibility of their rul-
ers. Their perspective was religious in the sense that they worshipped
God to gain salvation in the Hereafter. But it was also political as it
served the purpose of capturing political power. Modern ‘Islamists’ spoke
vehemently against elite corruption and the failure of rulers to cater for
the need of populations. They criticized the failure of the postcolonial
development project, the aggravation of poverty and unemployment and
the enrichment of political elites. They also organized networks of self-
help to relieve impoverished populations. Likewise, West African Mus-
lim reformers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries spoke against
the many taxes levied by rulers on populations and attempted to mobi-
lize marginalized groups against rulers in a project of social and political
transformation that would transfer power from oppressive rulers to re-
formers and their followers.
A third common denominator is their critical attitude towards court
ulama for the latter’s compromising attitudes towards a non-Islamic or-
der. As highlighted in the earlier discussion of the Suwarian tradition,
for centuries many learned Muslims worked in the courts of kings. They
provided the latter with protective talismans, helped them chronicle his-
tory, and so forth. But most of them did not preach a ‘strict religion’ to
the many nominally Muslim kings whom they served. Yet the latter, along-
side Islam, continued to practice pagan cults, drink alcohol, which is
forbidden in Islam, and entertained a harem, which exceeded the alloca-
tion of four wives. Unlike urban-based court ulama or merchant ulama,
who had a vested interest in preserving the status quo, most West Afri-
can leaders and rank and file members of revival and reform movements
were based in rural and self-sufficient agricultural communities. They
emphasized the acquisition of knowledge and the strict observance of
faith according to the Maliki school of law. They harshly criticized court
ulama for failing to fulfill the duty of commanding right and forbidding
wrong (amr bi-il ma’ruf wa al-nahy an al-munkar in Arabic). Likewise some
contemporary ‘Islamists’ have also criticized establishment ulama for
implicitly endorsing the perpetuation of a non-Islamic status quo by not
preaching against it. A case in point is the Egyptian ‘Islamist’ ideologue
Abdusalam Faraj, who in the tradition of Sayyid Qutb, published in 1981
a pamphlet entitled Al-farida al-gha’iba (the hidden imperative). The
core of Faraj’s argument was that Islam not only rests on five fundamen-
tal pillars (faith, prayer, tithe, fasting, and pilgrimage), but there is a
sixth obligation that ‘status quo’ ulama failed to emphasize: to dismiss a
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ruler who does not rule as Allah has revealed. Khalid Islambuli, who
assassinated the former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981,
claimed to have killed Pharoah, thereby fulfilling the sixth imperative of
the faith.
As argued by Mervyn Hiskett, the common denominator of Islamic
precolonial jihads in West Africa is that ‘they had a vision of a single
worldwide Islam, in which the way of life, the way of government, the
morality and social behavior of all individuals were regulated strictly
according to the Shari’a and the Sunna, the Law and the Tradition of the
Prophet’ (Hiskett 1984:170). This vision is a major common denomi-
nator between Muslim militant movements of the precolonial period
who rose against unjust and impious rulers, Muslim militants who re-
sisted against European colonial domination, as well as postcolonial
Muslim militant movements that challenged secular governments in pre-
dominantly Muslim countries. This leads to the discussion of the claim
that political Islam is predominantly Salafi.
‘Islamist’ Movements Are Not Primarily Salafi
Derived from the Arabic root salaf, which means to precede, the term
Salafiyya designates ‘the pious forefathers’, al-salaf al-salih. Salafiyya is
based on the belief that earlier generations closely followed the teach-
ings of the Prophet in the Koran and the Sunna (Tradition of the Prophet
Muhammad). Central to the Salafi creed is the notion that many Mus-
lim problems arise from the fact that Muslims have gone astray by com-
mitting innovation (bid’a), by which is meant beliefs and practices that
could neither be traced to the Prophet Muhammad nor to the salaf or
pious forefathers. Such innovations resulted either from foreign influ-
ences introduced by converts to Islam or popular beliefs, superstitions
and practices that were remnants of the pre-Islamic era.71 The solution
to the predicament of Muslim societies was to get rid of all these blame-
worthy innovations.
Two leading types of Salafiyya can be distinguished. First was a mod-
erate Salafiyya, an intellectual and political trend represented by the
teachings of Jamaladdin al-Afghani (1838–97), Muhammad Abduh
(1848–1905), and Rashid Rida (1865–1935), which attempted to build
a bridge between Islam and the West. Second, a more radical Salafiyya
can be traced to the teachings of thinkers such as Ibn Hanbal (780–
855), Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), and Muhamamad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
(1703–92). This branch of Salafiyya, which influences the thinking of
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such modern groups as the Wahhabi or the Taliban, tends to have a very
rigid and literal interpretation of the Koran. Although there is some over-
lap between these radical Salafists and political Islam, by no means are
all ‘Islamists’ Salafi. I contend that what has made the argument equat-
ing Salafism and ‘Islamism’ gain so much currency is the perception of
Wahhabi-minded groups as a threat.
The increasing wealth of the conservative Persian Gulf nations and
the commitment to supporting the spread of Wahhabism motivated many
Saudi charities and NGOs, with the blessing of the Saudi state, to fund
groups committed to proselytizing. During the Cold War, the US Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and the Pakistani secret services infiltrated these
Islamic organizations to recruit jihadists to fight against the Soviet Un-
ion in Afghanistan. Although most of these jihadists were devout Mus-
lims and anti-imperialists, who were convinced they were fighting for a
just cause, they were nevertheless on the side of the US and its allies
during the Cold War. Subsequently, some fought in Chechnya and Alge-
ria. After the end of the Cold War, jihadists targeted Western interests
as well as their own government. Their activities attracted the attention
of the Western media, the general public and numerous scholars.
Gilles Kepel (2000), for instance, painstakingly analyzes the context
of the rise of political Islam in the Muslim world in the 1970s. Drawing
evidence from North Africa to Egypt, Turkey, South and South-East Asia,
Kepel situates the rise of Islamism within the context of the decline of
Arab nationalism and the rise of Saudi Arabia to prominence. To make
sense of Islamism, he surveys the role of immigration, pilgrimage from
different parts of the Muslim world to the Gulf, the rise of the Islamic
banking system and the proliferation of Saudi charities. In the final analy-
sis, however, Kepel lays considerable emphasis on the role of Saudi Ara-
bia in the rise of the new Islamic radicalism. After the oil boom, argues
Kepel, inexhaustible funds were now available to promote the da’wa or
call to Islam, through Wahhabite preaching’ (Kepel 2000:72).
While the diffusion of Saudi oil wealth has no doubt played a role in
the expansion of political Islam, its importance has been largely exag-
gerated. The argument equating ‘Islamism’ to Salafism and tracing it to
the diffusion of Saudi generosity is flawed for at least three reasons.
First, it assumes that Saudi funding went primarily to Wahhabi-ori-
ented groups. Some pro-Wahhabi groups did get financial support from
Saudi religious authorities, but they did not enjoy a monopoly of Saudi
funding. Prominent Muslim leaders throughout the Muslim world ben-
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efited from Saudi largesse. Saudi Pan-Islamist policy can be traced to
the 1960s during King Faysal’s rule. Although committed to a certain
extent to spread Wahhabism globally, Pan-Islamism also aimed to cur-
tail the influence of Nasser’s nationalist Pan-Arabism, which conserva-
tive monarchies perceived as a threat. Within that framework, Saudi
Pan-Islamism searched for a broader legitimacy than Wahhabi-minded
groups could provide. It targeted prominent Muslim groups throughout
the Muslim world, and not only Wahhabi-minded groups. Some of the
founding members of the Muslim World League, which is the instru-
ment par excellence of Saudi Pan-Islamism, were not Wahhabi at all. For
example, take the Sufi Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse from Senegal (1900–
75), a towering figure in the history of West African Islam in the twenti-
eth century (Seeseman 2004:v) and who in the early 1960s was a found-
ing member and Vice-President of the MWL (Schultze 1990:192).
Second, no matter how generous, Saudi Arabian NGOs have not been
able to fund all Wahhabi-minded groups in the Muslim world. Most of
them, I would argue, did not receive significant funds from Saudi Arabia
for proselytization purposes. Rather, they raised their funds locally. This
was certainly true of the Society for the Removal of Heresy and Rein-
statement of Tradition, which is the largest single Muslim reform or-
ganization in Sub-Saharan Africa  (Kane 2003; Loimeir 1997).
Third, many Wahhabi groups in Nigeria, Mali, Senegal and elsewhere
emphasized the reform of religious practices but abstained from chal-
lenging ruling elites in their countries and did not seek to capture politi-
cal power.
The literature arguing that Salafism is a fundamental feature of po-
litical Islam tends to distinguish Sufi orders from ‘Islamists’ for at least
four reasons:
• the orders are viewed as syncretic whereas so-called ‘Islamist’ move-
ments emphasize the return to the fundamental sources of Islam,
namely the Koran and Sunna;
• the orders are construed as conservative and pro-status quo whereas
so-called Islamist movements are construed as subversive (Kepel
2000:48–50);
• the orders are said to appeal primarily to illiterate people whereas
‘Islamists’ are said to be the product of modern or Westernized edu-
cation (Kepel 2000);
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• the orders are believed to recruit largely among so-called traditional
peoples (in rural or ‘tribal’ areas) whereas so-called Islamist constitu-
encies are urban and modern (Kepel 2000).
This dichotomous construction has gained wide currency thanks to the
writings of influential anthropologists of Muslim societies, notably
Clifford Geertz and Ernest Gellner (see Geertz 1968; Gellner 1969,
1981). Both scholars tend to present these two forms of Islam as polar
opposites. In reality, there is a great deal of diversity among the Sufi
orders. The popular Sufism presented as an archetype by Geertz and
Gellner is only one variant of Sufism. In eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century Africa, at least three expressions of Sufi Islam could be found
(Brenner 1987:81).
The highly individualized variant is the first and oldest expression of
Sufism. Its adepts focused on devotional and spiritual practices and did
not employ the orders as a basis for social or political action (Brenner
1987:82). Pre-nineteenth century Mauritanian and other West African
orders are cases in point (Brenner 1987:82; Salih 1992:103–24). The
second type of Sufi orders conceived of themselves as a corporate group,
but were loosely structured and above all subsumed within other com-
munal structures such as the family, tribe, ethnic group, etc. (Brenner
1987). A third category comprises highly structured and politically ac-
tive Sufi groups (Brenner 1987). These new orders developed during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and provided the inspiration for
reform and state-building movements that swept across ‘Sudanic’ Af-
rica. They were centralized; their leaders as well as many rank and file
members were highly educated; they also recruited massively and oper-
ated autonomous agricultural organizations independent of royal courts;
Finally, they were active in protest movements. Therefore, they blurred
the boundaries between mystical, legal and political Islam. Their emer-
gence was part of an effort of revival and reform that reached its climax
during the second half of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nine-
teenth century (Rahman:2000; Esposito 1984:30–57; Voll:1994:24–83).
As Bradford Martin rightly argues:
… dedication to mysticism in no way hindered many of them from
being practical leaders of causes quite as much as being mystics or
intellectuals, and that most of them had expressed ideas in writing.
Also, most of them were very much in the contemporary intellectual
mainstream, they rejected blind imitation of what earlier thinkers
had done. They very often showed their great intellectual
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independence over such matters as hijra (‘removal’, ‘withdrawal’),
particularly in the face of a colonial takeover by some alien power,
and expressly opted for a form of juridical freedom (ijtihad) when it
was appropriate (Martin 2003:ix).
The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century movements of revival and re-
form in Islam took place as the dying Ottoman Empire, last rampart of
past Muslim glory, was undertaking radical reforms to halt its own de-
cline, including the adoption of three constitutions known as Tanzimat.
These measures fell short of curing the Sick Man of Europe, as Turkey
was named by Western chancelleries engrossed in debate about the fate
of the empire. The preoccupation with reform was certainly not limited
to official circles of the Ottoman Empire as many Muslim intellectuals
and activists believed that something ought to be done. As Albert Hourani
has documented so well in his seminal work on Arabic thought (Hourani
1983), some Muslims strove to bridge the growing divide between Islam
and the West (the moderate Salafis), while others submitted that the
return to the model of the Prophet was the only solution (the radical
Salafis).
Sufi orders were also part of this general effort of revival and reform.
They envisioned reform as the combination of devotional Sufi spiritual
exercises based on individual and collective recitation of litanies aimed
at purifying their soul; the study of the Sunna (tradition of the Prophet
Muhammad), which should serve as a model for all believers; and the
waging of the jihad of the mouth (jihad al-qawl) to spread the right faith,
and when it fails, the resort to the jihad of the sword to topple ‘unjust’
rulers and establish the rule of God.
The organizational structures of these centralized orders differed. The
Tijaniyya, a widespread Sufi order in contemporary Africa, was organ-
ized as follows: at the summit of the hierarchy, was the supreme shaykh.
This position was occupied by Ahmad al-Tijani of North Africa during
his lifetime, and his heir after his death. Before his death, the supreme
shaykh usually appoints a successor, often his oldest son, but sometime
a trusted lieutenant. He also appoints first-class deputies known as khalifa
(pl. khulafa) to represent the order in other regions or countries. Khulafa
are awarded the itlaq (authorization to initiate disciples, transmit eso-
teric knowledge and even to deliver supreme ijaza). The appointed rep-
resentative of the Tijaniyya in Black Africa, Al-Hajj Umar Tall (1797–
1864) of West Africa, is a case in point. A rank lower is that of second-
class deputies (muqaddam), who are only allowed to initiate a limited
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number of aspirants to the order. Finally, aspirants receive initiation and
are allowed to recite basic rituals but do not enjoy the privilege to initi-
ate or transmit knowledge. Deserving aspirants could, of course, rise in
this ladder to the rank of muqaddam of khalifa.
This hierarchical structure of the orders allowed for geographical de-
centralization of authority. Deputies would pay allegiance to the supreme
shaykh, but enjoy considerable autonomy in dealing with their own con-
stituencies. Most of these orders emphasized the study of the Hadith
(sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) and the necessity to transcend the
narrow jurisprudence of the four legal Sunni schools of law through a
resort to ijitihad or attempt to find a solution to the social and political
problems of the day (Brenner 1987:82).
Usman Dan Fodio wrote on Islamic mysticism (tasawwuf), political
activism (issues related to the jihad), theology and jurisprudence (Mar-
tin 2003:23–4). His writings were influenced by the teachings of his
master, Jibril b. Umar, a radical Tuareg teacher from Agades (Martin
2003), but his indignation towards the exploitation of the masses by
Habe rulers shaped the course of his life as reformer and state-builder.
The spearheads of the jihad in early nineteenth-century Hausaland, al-
though not Wahhabi, had an agenda of reform. They mastered the Is-
lamic jurisprudence and preached its rigorous implementation. They also
anathemized ‘venal’ scholars who manufactured talismans for, or worked
in the court of kings (Bradford 2003:28). In general, these so-called
venal scholars did not see as contradictory the combination of Islamic
and local African thaumaturgy. As Africans of different faiths believed in
the efficiency of local talismanic sciences that combined Islamic and Af-
rican magical knowledge, both Muslim and non-Muslims cooperated
(Brenner 2000), finding magical solutions to the hardships encountered
in their daily lives, caused by disease, climatic phenomena such as drought,
hunger and the general insecurity related to slave-raiding. Unlike the
Wahhabi whose Salafism entailed the rejection of Sufism, West African
Sufi reformers believed that Sufism was the highest expression of Is-
lamic ‘orthodoxy’ and criticized syncretism.
The ideal types (rural/urban, literate/illiterate, conservative/subver-
sive, syncretic/Salafi) that serve to contrast Sufi and ‘Islamists’ do not
withstand careful historical scrutiny. The Sufi milieu is well known for
its diversity and complexity. If Salafi movements are essentially urban-
based and appeal to literate strata, Sufi orders recruited across the geo-
graphical and social spectrum. If ‘Islamists’ tend to be subversive, they
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do not have the monopoly of this political orientation because some
Sufi organizations have attempted to capture political power by force.
Moreover, the propensity towards subversion or conservatism is inher-
ent neither in Sufi orders nor among ‘Islamists’, but rather is contingent
on the political circumstances in which they operate.
The point can be illustrated by the Tijaniyya Sufi order. In Algeria,
the Tijaniyya allied with the French, not because of any inherent inclina-
tion towards collaboration but in order to counter two enemies. On one
hand were the Ottoman Turks who defeated Tijani forces and publicly
decapitated the leader of the Tijaniyya, Muhammad al-Kabir al-Tijani.
The other enemy was Emir Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri, a Qadiri who was
supported by other rival Qadiri groups. The subsequent alliance of the
Tijaniyya with the French during colonial rule served strategic purposes.
The Algerian Salafi were very much part of the struggle for independ-
ence from colonial rule. It was no wonder that postcolonial official Alge-
rian rhetoric demonized Tijaniyya shaykhs, labeling them colonial col-
laborators and accusing them of practicing a syncretic Islam.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the spearhead of the same Tijaniyya, al-Hajj
Umar, fought against French expansion in West Africa. So did his son
and successor Ahmad al-Kabir. However, after the collapse of his em-
pire, his grandson, Sa’id Nur Tall, became the closest ally to the French
colonial rule of the entire Muslim establishment. Not only was he
awarded the highest and most prestigious medals and distinctions of
the French colonial state, but he was also appointed Khalif General for
West Africa, in effect the highest Islamic authority in West Africa (Garcia
1997). In Mauritania, Sufi families were divided regarding the attitude
to adopt towards the French colonizers. The Qadiriyya Fadiliyya is a
case in point. Shaykh Saad Buh was an ardent supporter of French colo-
nial rule whereas his brother Ma al-Aynayn vigorously opposed French
expansion and fought with his troops against them (Ould Abdallah
1997). During colonial rule, some Sufi orders were part of the colonial
establishment in West Africa while others maintained minimum con-
tact with colonial rulers.
There is no doubt that Sufi groups appealed to the illiterate and those
inclined to worship local saints, but they also provided networks of schools
in which both esoteric and exoteric knowledge were offered. Most Sufi
lodges (zawiyas) operated schools and provided Islamic knowledge to
members in search of knowledge. They emphasized the study of Islamic
law and like modern ‘Islamists’ they retain the right to ijtihad. The growth
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of literacy was largely due to the efforts deployed by Sufi orders, par-
ticularly in the aftermaths of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
jihads. As revealed in the manuscript heritage of West Africa, Sufi
shaykhs produced a literature in Arabic, Fulfulde, Hausa, Kanembu,
Wolof and other African languages with the Arabic script. This literature
includes devotional poems praising the Prophet in the tradition of Sufism,
legal opinions (fatwa), and political writings (Bobboyi 2008). Usually in
the form of poems condemning the arbitrary and exploitative rule of the
precolonial Hausa kings of northern Nigeria, this literature served to
mobilize a community of the Faithful longing for the overthrow of Hausa
rulers and establishing a just society (Bobboyi 2008).
As rightly argued by Mervyn Hiskett (Hiskett 1984:242) the West
African jihads of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were not only
political, but also intellectual revolutions. The emergence of an Islamic
clergy provided the sociological foundations for these revolutions. For
the first time in West African history, Muslim clerics, hitherto a toler-
ated minority, overthrew many rulers, many of whom were illiterate, and
replaced them. Therefore, some Sufi orders were undoubtedly politi-
cally active and stood against Western imperialism in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. But a question that requires an answer is
whether Sufi groups have contributed to the recent Islamic revival.  To
answer this question, I will address the Islamic revival in Senegal and
Nigeria.
The Senegalese Da’irat al-mustarshidin wa ‘l-mustarshidat (Circle of
men and women seeking guidance) is one of the largest ‘Islamist’ move-
ments in West Africa (Samson 2005). It claims half a million members,
based mostly in Senegal with branches in neighboring West African coun-
tries, Europe and the USA. Although this claim has not been independ-
ently confirmed, the Mustarshidin movement remains the largest neo-
Sufi movement in Senegal. It was founded by Cheikh Tidiane Sy and
his son Moustapha Sy, both members of a major Senegalese Tijani line-
age. They have at times supported the former ruling party of Senegal
(Parti socialiste sénégalais), and at other times led movements of protest
against it. During the campaign for the Senegalese presidential elections
of 1993, the Mustarshidin mobilized the youth to protest against the
ruling party and constituted the most serious religious and political op-
position to face the ruling party since Senegal became independent in
1960 (Kane and Villallon 1998).
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Northern Nigeria is another case where ‘Islamism’ is not predomi-
nantly Salafi. After Nigerian independence in 1960, Nigerian Muslims
adopted a largely secular criminal code. They also accepted the idea of a
federation in which no religion would be a state religion. Only a small
minority of Muslim students spoke out against the secular state and
advocated throughout the 1980s and much of the 1990s that Nigeria
should become an Islamic state. In 1999, the governor of the tiny north-
ern state of Zamfara re-enacted Islamic criminal law. Subsequently,
Muslims of all persuasions, including members of Sufi orders, in all other
predominantly Islamized states of northern Nigeria voiced demands for
the reintroduction of Islamic criminal law. As a result of popular pres-
sure, eleven of the northern states of the Nigerian federation introduced
some form of Islamic law in their criminal legislation. Thus, no particu-
lar doctrinal persuasion has been more prone than others to political
mobilization. Rather, it is the specific political contexts of struggle for
influence and resources, which determine the political agenda of Mus-
lim groups. This leads to the discussion of the perception of ‘Islamism’
as violent and irrational.
‘Islamist’ Movements Are Not Inherently Violent
From the late 1970s, a number of events in the Middle East contrib-
uted towards a growing fear about political Islam, and indeed about Is-
lam in general in the West. Starting with the summary execution of
members of the establishment of the former regime without due process
of justice to the imposition of the veil on women, these excesses culmi-
nated with the storming on 4 October 1979 of the American embassy in
Tehran by Iranian Muslim militants, who held 70 Americans captive for
fifteen months. The kidnapping of Western hostages in Lebanon by the
pro-Iranian Shiite group Hizbullah and the killing of almost a hundred
Western tourists in Egypt between 1990 and 1995 did nothing to allevi-
ate the fears inspired by some militant Muslim groups. In the 1990s,
‘Islamists’ became an even bigger threat. In 1993, a group of ‘Islamists’
attempted to bomb the World Trade Center in New York, causing mini-
mum casualties as compared to what would happen on 11 September. In
the interim, Usama Bin Laden, a former American ally in the war against
the Soviets in Afghanistan, declared a war against America. His follow-
ers, known as operatives of al-Qa’ida, attacked the US embassies in Dar
es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998, bombed the destroyer USS Cole in Oc-
tober 2000, and finally carried out the destruction of the World Trade
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Center on 9/11. These events were certainly the most audacious and
devastating in the history of modern terrorism. To these developments,
one must add the adoption of suicide-bombing tactics by Palestinians
fighting against the Israeli occupation of Palestine. The media coverage
of these events has provided many of the ingredients for equating
‘Islamism’ (and sometimes Islam in its entirety) with bigotry, violence
and terrorism.
There are two main schools of thought that have attempted to make
sense of the violence with which ‘Islamist’ movements are associated.
For want of better terms I will call them respectively the culturalist and
‘political talk’ schools for lack of better terms.8
This classification is based on my personal interpretation and does
not necessarily reflect the self-identification of the scholars whose views
I discuss in this section.
Inspired by Weberian analysis along the lines of The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism, the culturalist school of thought is based on
the assumption that culture shapes the behavior of individuals. It argues
that socio-economic factors are not determinant in understanding the
violent nature of al-Qa’ida and other jihadist organizations. It is rather
the extremely intolerant Wahhabi doctrine that incites people to murder
and violence (Gold 2003; Schwarz 2000). A more sophisticated variant
of what I call the ‘culturalist’ school distinguishes between tangible and
intangible incentives to join radical Islamist movements. Without dis-
missing the importance of tangible material benefits, this line of inter-
pretation argues that: ‘movement ideologies offer strategies for fulfill-
ing duties and maximizing the prospects of salvation on judgment day’
(Wiktorowicz and Kaltenhalter 2006:295). And: ‘Indoctrinated individu-
als viewed activism or even risk itself as a means to achieve salvation
and entrance into Paradise. Guided by the movement ideology, partici-
pants viewed suffering and effort as a testament to the certitude of be-
lief (assurance that they would achieve the spiritual payoffs). From this
perspective, the strategy of high cost/risk is strategically rational’
(Wiktorowicz and Kaltenhalter 2006:302).
The second school of thought, which emphasizes political talk, is
informed by the assumption that what is at stake is not religion or cul-
ture, but grievances rooted in the deployment of imperial power
(Mamdani 2004) and that the objective of terrorist groups is to force
these powers to withdraw their military troops from a specific region
(Pape 2005). According to Mamdani (2004:253–4), Bin Laden is not a
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theologian, but a politician, and nobody follows him for religious rea-
sons (Mamdani 2004:253–4). The most important political motivation
is their opposition to US imperialist policies in the Middle East, its un-
flinching support to the State of Israel and the violation of international
law by both the US and Israel.
However, both lines of arguments tell only one part of the story. The
Wahhabi doctrine has been elaborated over two centuries. During the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s, many people of Wahhabi inspiration spent
their lives without ever being involved in acts of terror, either in Saudi
Arabia or elsewhere. Until now, the majority of the people who claim to
be Wahhabi have never resorted to violence. Therefore, the culturalist
explanation is weak.
Typically inspired by secularization theory, the second explanation
also poses a problem, as it overlooks the fact that religion and politics
are not easy to separate if we want to understand Islamic politics. Reli-
gion, I argue, is an integral part of politics. Believers would typically
pursue two goals in their lives: on the one hand, they participate in poli-
tics, defined as ‘who gets ‘what, when and how’, and on the other hand,
they strive to do what pleases God to gain salvation in the Hereafter.
These two goals are inextricably interwoven.
Contemporary Saudi politics demonstrates that power needs religious
legitimation as much as resistance does. Given that most al-Qa’ida op-
eratives are Saudi, I will illustrate my points with the discussion of Saudi
Islamic politics. The political and epistemological foundations of mod-
ern Saudi Arabia is based on an alliance between two individuals Ibn
Sa’ud (d. 1765) and Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), and sub-
sequently between their descendants, al-Saud and al-Shaykh. The alli-
ance between these two families not only entailed power-sharing agree-
ments, but also intermarriages between these families. The class of
Muslim clerics dominated by the al-Shaykh has been consulted in the
most important decisions taken by the Saudi authorities (El-Tahri 2005).
When, in the early 1930s, King Abd al-Aziz b. Sa’ud, the founder of the
modern Saudi Kingdom, introduced technological innovations such as
railways, cars and motorcycles in an effort to modernize the country, he
faced strong opposition from the Ikhwan, the spiritual sons of the
Wahhabiyya. The Ikhwan perceived new technology as an innovation
contrary to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. King Abd al-Aziz
turned to the ulama to seek legitimacy. The latter issued legal advice
allowing the use of technology to serve the purpose of nation-building
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and to legitimize the crackdown on all those who opposed it, and hence
the suppression of the Ikhwan (El-Tahri 2005). When Abd al-Aziz Ibn
Saud needed resources to modernize his country and wanted to cut deals
with Americans for oil exploration, he had to convince the ulama that
there was nothing wrong in collaborating with non-Muslims as the
Prophet Muhammad collaborated with Jews and Christians when he re-
located to Medina (El-Tahri 2005). When King Saud, who succeeded
King Abd al-Aziz, turned out to be incapable of governing, the ruling
Saudi family concluded that deposing him was the only way out. They
turned to the ulama, who issued a legal fatwa allowing them to depose
King Saud. He was then exiled to Greece where he later died. In the late
1970s, when a group of extremists Saudis took over the Holy Mosque
of Mecca and their leader claimed to be the awaited Mahdi, the Saudi
regime had to seek legal advice again from the ulama before taking ac-
tion. The latter declared that the insurgents were apostates. Only then
did the Saudi troops with logistical help from the French attack the
mosque and put down the revolt (El-Tahri 2005). When Saddam Hussein
attacked Kuwait and upset the geopolitical balance of the Persian Gulf,
the Saudi were not confident about the capacity of their troops to pro-
tect the kingdom. They turned once again to the ulama, who legitimized
the coming of American troops to defend the country (El-Tahri 2005).
Similarly, opponents to power seek fatwa from some ulama to legiti-
mize their opposition. Any attempt of analysis that separates political
and religious factors would fail to accurately capture Muslim politics
because the two are intimately interwoven. Suicide-bombers have re-
ceived fatwas from ulama in support of the act of ‘suicide’. When blow-
ing themselves up, most of them (perhaps not all) are absolutely con-
vinced that they are pleasing God. It is not suicide that they are commit-
ting (intihar in Arabic), but martyrdom that they are seeking (istishhad in
Arabic).
However, to say that religion matters is neither a support for ‘the
clash of civilizations’ argument, nor to argue that religious convictions
can explain everything. As some of the preceding examples show, reli-
gious conservatism does not rule out collaborating with people from
other religions or even with those without religion to promote strategic
interests. The ideology of Wahhabi Islam did not prevent Saudi leaders
from becoming the best collaborators of the US during the twentieth
century since the strategic interests of the Saudi were at stake. Undoubt-
edly, religion is part of the political culture of ‘Islamist’ movements. Yet
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the ideology of religious radicalism does not necessarily lead to strong
political opposition movements without grievances. In this respect, ‘Is-
lamist’ politics is not any different from non-Islamic politics. It is also
often largely based on rational calculation and pragmatism.
I argue that ‘Islamist’ movements are not more likely than secular
political organizations to resort to violence. If the political terrain is demo-
cratic enough to allow fair political participation, ‘Islamist’ movements
are likely to be driven to moderation (Kalyvas 2000). Lisa Anderson has
rightly argued that ‘the absence of a reliable, transparent institutional
framework for political opposition to work within not only hampers the
routinization of opposition of all kinds but magnifies the profile and
broadens the constituency of “rejectionists” or “disloyal” parties’
(Anderson 1997:19). She further argued that: ‘as a general rule, the
closer the [Muslim militant] movements were to the prospects of shar-
ing power, the more pragmatic they are’ (Anderson 1997:26). Conversely,
under regimes of despotism, which have been the rule not the exception
in the Arab/Muslim world, ‘Islamists’ are likely to go underground. For
example, the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, who are one of the first mass
militant Islamic movements in the twentieth century, started as a branch
of a Sufi order committed to promoting the faith. They initially did not
have a goal of bringing down the Egyptian monarchy, but sought to pro-
mote an Islamic ideal for society. After the coup d’état of the Free Offic-
ers in 1952, the Muslim Brothers sided with the military and empha-
sized social work to recruit membership. Their goal was to moralize public
life and to preach for an Islamic purity. However, the autocratic rule of
President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt criminalized all forms of dis-
sent and caused the political alienation of the Muslim Brothers, driving
the latter towards a political radicalization.
In Morocco and Jordan, a large segment of Muslim militants partici-
pate in electoral politics and are not involved in organized violence. In
Turkey, ‘Islamists’ won the elections in 2003 and formed a government,
which does not differ in any way from the governments of other secular
countries. Although its leaders are devout Muslims in their private life,
they remain committed to secularism. The Turkish ‘Islamist’ govern-
ment (a secular ruling party with ‘Islamist’ roots as it is called by some)
is much more committed to joining the European Union than to pro-
moting pan-Islamism. It is presiding over a fundamental reform of Turk-
ish laws and mores in order to prepare the country for membership in
the EU. In the field of family law, it has recently repealed a law
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criminalizing adultery, which is one aspect of the Islamic legacy. The
current Turkish ‘Islamist’ government has taken more steps towards
granting cultural and political rights to minorities than any preceding
‘non-Islamist government’. For the first time since the creation of mod-
ern Turkey, Kurds are allowed to speak their language and operate radio
and television programs in Kurdish. Hitherto, the mere mention of the
name Kurd exposed people to repression. Indeed, the current Turkish
government is likely to take other measures required to ‘Europeanize’
the country.
Hizbullah in Lebanon is another militant Muslim party, which tries
to combine the use of military power to fight against the Israeli occupa-
tion of southern Lebanon, including the use of human bombs, with sub-
tle political negotiation and alliances with Christians whenever this serves
their strategic interests. Between 1982 and 1986, Hizbullah conducted
36 suicide terrorist attacks against French, American, and Israeli targets,
killing 659 people (Alagha 2005:35; Pape 2005:129). In the parliamen-
tary elections of June 2005, Shaykh Hassan Nasrallahn, the leader of
Hizbullah, exhorted his followers to vote for candidates of the outlawed
Christian militia, the Lebanese forces (Kifner 2005:16). I argue that
‘Islamist’  movements are neither irrational nor inherently violent. Where
they can peacefully accede to power and influence society, they are as
likely as any secular political groups to seek power through peaceful
means. Most have resorted to violence when the terrain did not allow
for peaceful political action. However, I must emphasize that I am not
arguing that ‘Islamist’ movements are inherently democratic as there is
no guarantee that once in control of government, they would not be
tempted, like nationalist and socialist regimes, to monopolize power
and criminalize political opposition.
 Conclusion
In this essay, I have argued that there are many similarities between
contemporary Muslim militant movements referred to as ‘Islamist’ and
movements of revival and reform of the nineteenth century, and that
there is no compelling case to use a new term to qualify the former. Had
‘Islamism’ been defined broadly to include earlier movements of pre-
ceding centuries, I would not have taken issue with the term. But de-
fined as a twentieth-century ideology, the term ‘Islamism’ fails the test
of providing new insights. I have also argued that Muslim militants striving
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to transform society or take power are not primarily Salafi, nor inher-
ently violent. To refute the notion of the newness of ‘Islamism’, I have
argued that the rhetoric of leaders of West African jihads in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries shows a striking similarity to so-called
Islamist movements of the twentieth century: a strong opposition to
European hegemony, a denunciation of exploitation, and a commitment
to fostering a political system governed by Islamic laws. With regard to
anti-colonialism, the Sanusiyya in Libya, Niger and Chad opposed the
British, the French, and the Italians. Similarly, the Tijaniyya of Umar
Tall fought fiercely against French colonial domination in West Africa.
The anti-colonial dimensions of their actions parallel very much the
opposition to Westernization by many contemporary ‘Islamists’. Nine-
teenth-century Islamic militants in West Africa aimed at replacing the
dominant forms of mixed Islam in West Africa with a legal system based
on the Shar’ia. Similarly, contemporary ‘Islamists’ have as their princi-
pal aim the dismantling of modern European-inspired legal codes and
constitutions and replacing them with Shar’ia law.
Olivier Roy’s point that Islamism was conceived to ‘keeping with the
major ideologies of the twentieth century’ is an interesting one. It alerts
to the influence that twentieth century ideologies may have had on ‘Is-
lamist ideologues’. Arguments along those lines have emphasized that
contemporary political Islam is indebted to other ideologies such as so-
cialism, constitutionalism and third-worldism for ideas of social justice,
revolt against an unjust ruler or anti-imperialism. I concur that postcolonial
Muslim militants were aware of competing ideologies, not least because
they engaged in debates with communists, liberals and others on univer-
sity campuses. It is also true that many contemporary ideologues of
Islamism are quite at home with various ideologies born in the twentieth
century. From Al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to Qutb, Mawdudi,
Ghannouchi, Abbasi Madani and Hasan Al-Turabi, many Islamist
ideologues have been steeped in Western liberal traditions. Hasan Al-
Turabi obtained his Ph.D. in Law at the Sorbonne, Abbasi Madani his
Ph.D. in Education in Britain, Mawdudi was a journalist and Sayyid
Qutb studied in the USA. Different ideologies may have had some in-
fluence on some contemporary Islamist ideologues. Such an influence,
however, need not be exaggerated. As shown in the analysis of the
worldview of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century militant ‘movements
of revival and reform’, ideas of greater social justice, of the necessity to
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overthrow an unjust ruler, or to resist foreign occupation and exploita-
tion are not foreign to the classical tradition of Islam and cannot be
argued to date from the twentieth century. The fact that such ideas are
articulated in contemporary ‘Islamist’ discourse does not result exclu-
sively from the influence of various twentieth-century ideologies.
I have also argued that ‘Islamist’ movements are not primarily Salafi
and that the opposition Sufi/Salafi is misleading since the whole pur-
pose of the politically active and highly structured Sufi orders since the
late eighteenth century has been to reconcile the divisions between a
speculative and ecstatic Sufism and a more strict observance of the
Shari’a. Here again, I have provided examples from West Africa to illus-
trate my point. I have also argued that Sufism does not only appeal to
illiterate people looking for a personal incarnation of the sacred, as
Gellner puts it, but also to the educated in society. In West Africa in
particular, much of the growth of literacy is rooted in the educational
efforts of the Sufi orders. Sufi Shaykhs wrote not only devotional litera-
ture: they also produced political writings criticizing the oppression and
exploitation that many populations were suffering during the precolonial
period. Indeed, they sometimes led wars of liberation in favor of those
populations. I have also briefly documented the existence of this form
of Sufi ‘Islamism’ in West Africa.
Finally, I have argued that ‘Islamists’ are not inherently violent and
that ‘Islamist’ politics is no less pragmatic than secular politics. The re-
sources and constraints of the milieu in which they operate determine to
a great extent what strategy they adopt for their struggle, and whether
the moderates or the hardliners within each ‘Islamist’ group would im-
pose their agenda. If ‘Islamists’ can achieve their goals through peaceful
means, they are not likely to rush underground.
The unanswered question remains: what is fundamentally new about
Islamic militantism? No doubt that the context of their rise is new: the
new Islamic movements born in the twentieth century appeared in the
context of secularization of Muslim societies. While the project of
secularization was introduced by European colonial rulers, it was pur-
sued after independence by authoritarian and corrupt local rulers who
not only failed to provide for their peoples, but also restricted their
freedoms, and criminalized all forms of opposition. In voicing their op-
position against secularized Muslim governments, new Muslim militants
used a rhetoric that emphasized the return to pristine Islam and social
justice rooted in a similar milieu to that of their predecessors.
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Another new development was the impact of the Islamic Revolution
in Iran on international affairs. The successful 1979 Islamic Revolution
led by Khomeini in what was previously considered as one of the most
pro-Western countries in the Middle East was unquestionably a water-
shed in Western/Muslim relations. It came as a great shock to many
Westerners because the revolution ousted a trusted ally of the Cold War.
It also contributed to creating the image of Islam as a threat to the West.
A third new development is the new Islamic presence in the West.
Increasing numbers of labor migrants, students and refugees from Mus-
lim countries have settled in Western Europe and North America in the
last three decades. The number of such Muslims in the early twenty-first
century is estimated at some 30 million, an unparalleled presence in
history. During the same period, proselytizing groups from Muslim coun-
tries such as the Tablighi Jama’at, the World Muslim League and many
others have been committed to re-Islamizing Muslim communities in
the West. They have made inroads in the suburbs of Paris, Berlin, Am-
sterdam, New York and London. With the help of devout students from
Muslim countries, they strive to carve out a Muslim space in the West.
Their efforts focus on establishing shops and restaurants providing
Muslim halal food, mosques, on Islamic schools and cultural centers,
research institutes, newspapers and charities. These Islamic institutions
have proliferated in large European cities. In France alone, the number
of mosques increased from 10 to almost 1,000 between 1960 and 1975
(Kepel 1991).
The efforts of recent immigrants are echoed in the public space by
second-generation Muslims. Facing racism and exclusion in the West,
some Arabs, Turks and African Muslims born in the West have started
to assert their Islamic identity and are making claims that suddenly alert
the host society to take notice of their presence. New Muslim claims
include the right to build new mosques, the demand for separate burial
grounds, the right to wear ‘decent clothes’ and the right not to face job
discrimination because of their origins. The combination of this asser-
tive Islamic presence in the West and the challenges to secularism in
Iran and Afghanistan are what prompted many Western decision-mak-
ers and scholars to misconstrue ‘Islamism’ as new and different from the
expressions of political Islam in the past.
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Notes
1.   Italics mine.
2.   This is another term for ‘Islamist movements’ in Kepel’s work.
3. Burgat does argue that ‘the political mobilisation of traditional religious
mystics is not without rapport to Islamism. The Senusiyya was one of the
first vectors to the resistance against French colonial invasion. A simple
recollection of the role of the Sufi brotherhoods in the resistance to coloni-
alism from Algeria to Sudan to the Libyan Senoussi is enough to justify
nuances’ (‘la mobilisation des mystiques religieux de type traditionnel n’est
pas sans rapport avec l’islamisme. La Senousissya fut l’un des premiers vecteurs
à la résistance à la pénétration française …(Burgat 1988:19, n.18). Yet he
does not draw the full implications of this as he concurs with the notion that
the Muslim Brothers are the first Islamists.
4. This movement of thought is identified in Roy’s work as ‘Islamism’.
5. The Arab medieval writers gave the name Bilad al-Sudan (Land of the Blacks)
to Sub-Saharan Africa.
6. Because of lack of space the availability of a substantial body of literature on
these revolutions, I will not discuss them in detail here, but I refer to Curtin
1971; Last 1987; Robinson 2000.
7. Islamic theologians have utmost contempt of the pre-Islamic era, which
they have named as Jahiliyya, literally ‘ignorance’ in reference to the fact that
people did not worship one God.
8. This classification is based on my personal interpretation and does not nec-
essarily reflect the self-identification of the scholars whose views I discuss in
this section.
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